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Abstract 
The overall aim of this thesis is to better understand how politics and preferences 
influence policy outcomes. The thesis consists of two papers that examine two 
different policy outcomes in Swedish municipalities.  
Paper I analyzes the effect of income and education on the environmental policy 
performance of Swedish local governments. In estimating the effects of income and 
education we will also examine how they interact with political participation.  To 
examine this I use panel data based on an environmental ranking of Swedish 
municipalities made every year between 1993 and 2001.  The empirical results 
show that there is a positive relationship between income and the environmental 
policy performance. This relationship is however captured by controlling for the 
education level, which has a positive relationship with the environmental policy 
performance. Controlling for municipal fixed effects and relevant control variables 
does not change this result.  Furthermore we find that political participation has 
significant interaction effects with both income and education. 
Paper II develops a regression discontinuity (RD) design to estimate the causal 
effect of political party power on the placement of refugee immigrants in Swedish 
municipalities. That Swedish municipalities have a proportional election system puts 
forward specific challenges for using a RD design, which this paper will provide 
solutions to. The identification strategy is based on the idea that a specific party 
getting one more seat or not in the municipal council can be considered as good as 
random if the party is close to a seat change. Even though this paper only looks at 
Swedish data the method could be applied to other countries with proportional 
election systems. The results of the paper show that the political party power has a 
large effect on the placement of refugee immigrants in Swedish municipalities. 
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1  Introduction 
The overall aim of this thesis is to better understand how politics and 
preferences influence policy outcomes. The two papers will try to answer 
two different, but related, questions. Paper I will examine relationship 
between the education level and income level of the population and the 
environmental policy performance by Swedish Municipalities between 1993 
and 2001.This means that I examine how the characteristics of the 
population affect policy outcomes. How the characteristics affect the policy 
outcome will naturally be dependent on how the characteristics influence 
the preferences of the populations and how those preferences are transferred 
into public policy. Because of this the paper will also attempt to explain how 
the characteristics of the population affect how preferences are transferred 
into public policy. Paper II examines the causal effect of political party 
power on the placement of refugee immigrants between 1986 and 2006. 
This means that I will examine how public policy is affected by the political 
parties independent of the preferences of the population.  From a 
methodological perspective these questions are quite different, which means 
that they also will different types of results. In Paper I it is only possible to 
observe a relationship between the outcome and the characteristics of the 
population while the second paper estimates a causal relationship between 
political party power and the policy outcome. 
The thesis will be laid out as follows. An overview of the empirical 
methods used will be given in section 2. Section 3 will give background 
information on Swedish municipalities, their political system and discuss 
why Swedish municipalities are suitable for empirical quantitative studies. 
The two papers included in the thesis are summarized in section 4. Section 5 
discusses and concludes. 
   8 
2  Empirical Framework 
A central issue within empirical economic (econometric) studies is that of 
endogeneity, which also is central in the two papers of this thesis. The 
formal definition of endogeneity is that the explanatory variable is correlated 
with the disturbance, or error term, in the estimations (Wooldridge, 2002). 
A less formal definition is that the effect of the explanatory variable on the 
outcome variable we observe in an empirical estimation is not caused by the 
explanatory variables. There are three general sources of endogeneity in 
econometrics, omitted variables, measurement error and simultaneity. The 
problem with omitted variables, which will be discussed in detail below, is 
caused by that we can not control for all relevant variables. Measurement 
errors will cause endogeneity if the errors are correlated with the 
explanatory variables. Endogeneity will arise from simultaneity if the 
explanatory variables are in part determined by the outcome variable.  
The two papers of the thesis will be centered on the omitted variable 
problem, which is why this problem is explained in detail. In general we 
want to estimate the effect of an explanatory variable, A, on the outcome 
variable, B. It might however be the case that a variable, C, affects, affects 
both A and B. If we directly examine the relationship between A and B we 
would also pick up the effect of C, giving us a biased (or untrue) estimate 
for the effect of A on B.  How can the omitted problem be solved? Two 
general types of solutions can be found in econometric literature. The first 
and most obvious is to simply include and control for C in the estimation. 
By doing this we are able to say that the relationship we observe between A 
and B is not caused by C. We might however not be able to observe C, or 
there might be a variable D, which affects both A and B, which we are not 
aware of. This means that we would have to take another approach to solve 
the omitted variable problem. If we could find a random variation of A, we 
get a consistent estimate of the effect of A on B without having to include   9 
any control variables. This is because a random variable is not correlated 
with any predetermined characteristics. By finding a random variation we 
would also, per definition, solve the problems with measurement error and 
simultaneity. Paper I will take approach of including control variables, while 
Paper II will make use of a random variation. It would naturally be 
preferable to always use a random variation in the explanatory variable, but 
in most cases it is not possible to find a random variation.  
To give an example of the omitted variable problem, relevant to the 
thesis, we could say that we want to estimate the effect of political power of 
the Conservative Party on the tax rate of Swedish municipalities. If we look 
at the relationship between seat share for the Conservative Party and tax rate 
we would find a strong negative relationship. Would this mean that a larger 
seat share would lead to a lower tax rate? The obvious answer to this 
question is no. There are probably variables that affect both the tax rate and 
the seat share of the Conservative Party, which means that the seat share of 
the Conservative Party is an endogenous variable. In municipalities with a 
high income level per capita there is a larger tax base and the municipality 
would thus need a lower tax rate for a given level of expenses. Hence there 
is a negative relationship between the income level and the tax rate. There 
also have a strong positive relationship between the income level and votes 
for the Conservative Party since individuals with a high income level tend to 
vote for the Conservative Party. The strong negative relationship between 
the seat share of the Conservative Party and the tax rate could thus be 
explained by the income level in the municipality. The two types of 
solutions to this would be to either control for all variables that could both 
affect the tax rate and the seat share of the Conservative Party, or to find a 
random (exogenous) variation in the seat share of the Conservative Party. 
The latter is also what is done in paper 2.    10 
3  Swedish Municipalities 
3.1  Background Information 
There are 290 municipalities in Sweden. They differ widely both in area, 
from 9 to 19 447 square kilometers, and population, from 2 558 to 780 817 
inhabitants. The municipalities have large freedoms in organizing their 
activities as they see fit. One of the most important rights is the right to levy 
income taxes, which range from 17.57 % to 23. 57 %, and account for 
roughly two thirds of the municipal incomes. Education and the care of 
elderly and disabled account for close to two thirds of the costs. The 
municipalities are governed by the municipality boards. Elections to the 
municipal boards are held every fourth year together with the national and 
regional elections. The seven main national parties also dominate municipal 
politics, but many municipal councils also have representatives from local 
parties. 
3.2  Political System 
    The Swedish municipalities have, just like Sweden at the national level, a 
proportional election system. Elections to the municipal councils are held 
every fourth year together with the national and regional elections. Before 
1994 the elections were held every third year. In the councils there are 
subcommittees responsible for different policy areas such as education and 
city planning. The municipalities have a "quasi parliamentary" system where 
the heads of the subcommittees are appointed by a governing majority, 
which is the equivalency of the government at the national level. 
    The  seven  main  national  parties  also dominate municipal politics, but 
many municipal councils also have representatives from local parties. The   11 
division between the right wing and left wing block is not as clear at the 
municipal level as at the national level. The members of the governing 
councils are elected from multimember electoral districts. Most commonly 
the municipalities are made up on one electoral district. When the 
municipality has more than one district the representatives are elected from 
each district separately. The number of seats per district ranges from 15 to 
49. The number of electoral districts and how they are drawn is decided by 
the municipality councils a year prior to the elections. 
3.3  Swedish Municipalities as an empirical testing ground 
Both papers in this thesis make use of data from Swedish municipalities. 
There are many advantages with using Swedish municipalities for empirical 
quantitative studies. The first, and most obvious, advantage is that it allows 
for using many observations since there are 290 municipalities. Furthermore 
Statistics Sweden collects and provides an excellent set of data for Swedish 
Municipalities for a large number of variables, usually covering long time 
periods. That the data covers long time periods implies that we can use 
panel data. Using panel data means data we can make use of better and more 
reliable empirical methods than if we are restricted to using cross-sectional 
data. The large number of variables we have available makes it possible to 
include several control variables in estimations. Since all municipalities have 
the same institutional framework it is also easy to compare outcomes 
between municipalities. 
 There are naturally some problems associated with using data from 
Swedish municipalities. Even though the studies on Swedish municipalities 
might have large internal validity they might have low external validity. 
Many features and characteristics of Swedish municipalities are unique to 
them. This implies that the results we get for the Swedish municipalities 
might not be applicable to other political entities. This is naturally true for 
the results of this thesis, especially for Paper II that examines the effects of 
parties that are unique to Sweden. Many political entities do however share 
their political system with Swedish municipalities which means that the 
methods developed in Paper II can be applied to them. 
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4  Summary of Papers 
The thesis consists of two papers, of which a short summary will be given 
below. 
4.1  Paper I: Environmental Policy Performance of Swedish Local 
Governments: Is it the Mind or the Money? 
At the centre of debate concerning sustainable development lays the issue 
of the relationship between income and pollution. Will we be able to have 
continuous economic growth without deterioration of the environment? Is 
there a trade-off between economic growth and environmental quality? 
Previous studies have usually focused on examining the existence of the so-
called Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC), which hypothesizes an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between income and pollution. Within the 
EKC literature it is often suggested that EKC can partly be explained by a 
positive relationship between income and better environmental policy 
performance. This paper examines if there actually is such a relationship for 
Swedish municipalities and, if there is one, if it can be explained by a higher 
education level instead of income. Panel data from a survey based 
environmental policy ranking of all Swedish municipalities made all years 
between 1993 and 2001 is used for the empirical estimations.  
Previous studies of the relationship between income level and 
environmental policy include De Bruyn (1997), Dasgupta et al (2001) and 
Bimonte (2002). These studies all find a positive relationship between 
income level and stricter environmental policies. There are no studies that 
have explicitly looked at the relationship between education and 
environmental policy. Within the EKC literature there are however papers 
that have examined the relationship between education and pollution. Both 
Torras & Boyce (1998) and Bond & Farzin (2006) find that the demand for   13 
environmental quality increases with education. Common to previous 
studies of the relationship between income and environmental policy is the 
use of cross-country data.  
The most important contributions of this paper are that it is the first to 
use within country data to estimate the relationship between income and 
environmental policy and that it also includes education variables in the 
empirical estimations. The first set of results is in line with previous studies 
and supports that there is a positive relationship between income and 
environmental policy performance. However, including education in the 
empirical estimations shows that the positive relationship between income 
and environmental policy performance is caused by education, which has a 
positive relationship with the environmental policy performance. The latter 
result holds both for including fixed municipal effects and relevant control 
variables in the estimations. Furthermore the results show that there are 
significant interaction effects for political participation with both income and 
education.  
4.2  Paper II: The Effect of Political Parties on the Placement of 
Refugee Immigrants in Swedish Municipalities 
This paper develops a regression discontinuity (RD) design to estimate the 
causal effect of the political parties on the placement of refugee immigrants 
in Swedish municipalities. The placement of refugee immigrants in 
individual municipalities is a widely debated subject in Sweden, both at the 
national and the local level. The debate at the national level is centered on 
how to even out the distribution of refugee immigrants between 
municipalities and how the concentration of refugee immigrants in ethnic 
enclaves affects the integration process. At the local level the debate is 
focused around what capacity the municipality has to take care of newly 
arrived immigrants and what obligations the municipality has to receive new 
refugee immigrants. In some municipalities the issue of how many refugee 
immigrants the municipality should receive has led to the formation of single 
issue parties in some municipalities. The effect of political parties on the 
placement of refugee immigrants is an important question to answer out of 
two perspectives. If political parties affect the placement of refugee 
immigrants we can with certainty say that other issues than the welfare and 
integration of the refugee immigrants affect where they are placed. We can 
also examine if and how national party identities affect the behavior of local 
representatives.   14 
Measuring the causal effect of political parties on policy outcomes is 
challenging. The distribution of political power is affected both by 
unobservable and observable variables that affect both the inflow of refugee 
immigrants and how people vote in a municipality. It is thus not possible to 
identify causal effects by simply looking at the seat share of a party. Even 
though it is possible to control for all observable variables there could still be 
unobservable variables that can not be controlled for. It is thus necessary to 
find an exogenous variation in seat shares of the parties to identify the effect 
of political parties. 
By using a RD design it is possible to isolate a random, and thus 
exogenous component, in the seat distribution. The basic idea behind RD 
design is to estimate treatment effects by assuming that the assignment to a 
treatment is determined at least partly by the value of an observed covariate 
lying on either side of a fixed threshold is random within a small interval of 
the covariate (Imbens, G.W. & Lemieux, T, 2008). In this case the 
threshold will be getting a seat, while the observed covariate is the vote 
share. If a party is close enough to receiving or loosing a seat the event of 
getting the seat is as good as random. This means that we can estimate the 
effect of an increased seat share by comparing the inflow in refugee 
immigrants between observations when a particular party has been close to 
either receiving or loosing a seat. The Swedish municipalities have a multi-
party proportional elections system, which puts forward specific challenges 
for using a RD design to identify the causal effect of political parties on 
policy outcomes. Treating the Swedish municipalities as majoritarian 
election systems Petterson-Lidbom (2008) estimates political party effects on 
policy outcomes such as the income tax rate and unemployment using a 
strategy a RD design. The basic idea behind the identification strategy is that 
municipalities where elections are very close between the two main political 
party blocks are similar in all aspects except political block winning the 
election. The idea that Swedish political system can be treated as 
majoritarian is for example supported by Alesina et al. (1997) who argue that 
the strong left-right division in Swedish politics essentially makes Sweden 
bipartisan. Petterson-Lidbom (2008) finds that political parties affect policy 
outcomes. Treating Swedish municipalities as majoritarian election systems is 
however problematic, which is discussed in detail in the paper. 
The main contribution of this paper is to develop a RD design specifically 
for proportional election system. Even though this paper only looks at 
Swedish data the methods developed could be applied to other countries 
with proportional election systems. The paper is also the first to examine   15 
how parties affect the placement of refugee immigrants in Swedish 
municipalities 
The results of the paper show that the political parties do affect the 
placement of refugee immigrants. I find, as one would expect, the largest 
effect when I examine the effect of a seat change between two specific 
parties. There are statistically significant effects of seats moving both within 
and between the traditional political blocks indicating that individual parties 
can affect policy outcomes. 
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